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Allocating Liability for Deficient
Warnings on Generic Drugs:
A Prescription for Change
ABSTRACT
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies create pioneer drugs
that cure diseases around the world. However, because research and
development costs are very high, brand-name drugs are expensive. In
response to escalating costs, Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ("Hatch-
Waxman Act") to promote generic competition. As generics become
more prominent in the pharmaceutical marketplace, individuals
injured by generic drugs are suing the manufacturers with more
frequency. The cases often turn on which company should bear the
liability for failing to warn-the brand-name manufacturer or the
generic drug maker. Although the injured person took the generic
drug, the generic company has much less control over the warning
label than the pioneer company. Courts thus far have attempted to
compensate injured plaintiffs by either holding the brand-name
manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a competitor's product, or
holding the generic manufacturer liable for label deficiencies it did not
create. This Note discusses alternatives to redress injured individuals:
(1) clarifying the role of generic drug manufacturers in the label
formation and amendment process by the FDA; (2) labeling of generic
drugs by the FDA; and (3) creating a federal trust fund, similar to the
Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, to compensate plaintiffs
who prove deficiencies in generic drug labels.
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Brand-name pharmaceutical companies create "pioneer" drugs
that cure diseases around the world. However, because research and
development costs are very high, brand-name drugs are expensive.'
Between 1990 and 2005, United States consumer spending on
prescription drugs increased fivefold to $251.8 billion per year. 2
During that same time period, prescription drug expenditures grew at
twice the rate of other health care spending and nearly five times that
of the overall economy. 3 The average price per prescription also
increased dramatically, from $9.50 in 1981 to $53.92 in 2004.4 A large
portion of the price increase can be attributed to the approval process
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a new drug, which
takes an average of twelve to fifteen years and costs more than $800
million per drug.5 Indeed, only 30% of FDA-approved pharmaceuticals
recover the cost of their research and development.6
In response to these escalating costs, Congress enacted the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
1. Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve the
Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 443 (2008).
2. Christopher Lea Lockwood, Comment, Biotechnology Industry Organization v.
District of Columbia: A Preemptive Strike Against State Price Restrictions on Prescription
Pharmaceuticals, 19 ALB. L.J. SCl. & TECH. 143, 149 (2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 148.
6. Id.
186 [Vol. 13:1:185
DEFICIENT WARNINGS ON GENERIC DRUGS
("Hatch-Waxman Act") to promote generic competition.' Congress
intended the Act to "strike a balance between two competing policy
interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new
drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of
those drugs to market."8  Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
significant lag between patent issuance and FDA approval left the
manufacturers of pioneer pharmaceuticals with relatively short
effective patent terms during which to recoup their investment.9 The
Hatch-Waxman Act provides brand-name, or "innovator," drug
companies with limited patent term extensions to restore some of the
market exclusivity lost during the lengthy drug development and
approval processes. 10  In exchange for that benefit to pioneer
manufacturers, the Act also includes a patent infringement exception
that permits generic companies to conduct experiments to create
generic versions of pioneer products." Additionally, the Act
substantially shortened the FDA approval process for generics by
providing that the generic manufacturers need not independently test
a generic drug for safety or efficacy, but need only demonstrate
chemical equivalence to the approved pioneer drug.12 Generic drug
development now averages three to five years, and the FDA generally
approves chemically identical versions.13
Because generic manufacturers expend no resources on
innovative research or expensive clinical trials, they can sell their
products at much lower prices.14 The first generic manufacturer to
enter the market discounts the price of the brand-name drug by an
average of 5 to 25%,15 and once a generic enters the market, the brand
loses an average of 44% of its market.'6 In markets with ten or more
generic competitors, the average generic price falls to less than half of
what the brand-name commanded before the arrival of competition on
7. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.).




12. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006); Allergan, Inc., v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d
1322, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
13. Liu, supra note 1, at 484.
14. Id. at 447.
15. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MIcH. L. REV. 37, 50 (2009).
16. Id. at 49.
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the market.17 The Hatch-Waxman Act has effectively increased the
development and availability of generic drugs.18 Since 1984, the
generic market share increased from less than 20% to 65% in 2008.19
From 2000 to 2009, generic drugs saved the U.S. healthcare system
over $824 billion, and in 2009 alone, savings approached $140
billion.20
To gain FDA approval under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic
drug company must certify the bioequivalence of its product to an
approved brand-name drug, and that the warnings and labeling match
those for the brand-name, or "listed," drug.21 Because the generic drug
is chemically identical to the brand-name drug, the FDA does not
require generic companies to repeat the clinical trials and safety
studies that pioneer manufactures conduct to generate the original
warning labels. 22 Generic companies are not permitted to alter that
labeling. Indeed, the generic drug system is economically efficient
precisely because generic manufacturers do not study or test a drug
beyond ensuring that its version is chemically identical to the brand-
name version.
As generics become more prominent in the pharmaceutical
marketplace, individuals injured by generic drugs are suing the
manufacturers with more frequency. 23 The cases often turn on who
should bear the liability for failing to warn-the brand-name
manufacturer, or the generic drug maker. Although the injured
person took the generic drug, the generic company has much less
control over the warning label than the pioneer company.
In 2009, the California Supreme Court declined to review Corte
v. Wyeth.24 In that case, the California Court of Appeals held that
when a doctor foreseeably relies on a brand-name drug's label and
warnings, the pioneer manufacturer's duty to warn extends even to
17. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xiii (1998),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.
18. See id. at 49-50.
19. Id. at 49.
20. GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, SAVINGS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE USE OF
GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS 1 (2009), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/sites/default/files/
GPhA%20Savings%2OStudy%2OBook%20Updated%2OWeb%20FINAL%20Jul23%2010_0.pdf.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355()(2)(A) (2006).
22. Carrier, supra note 16, at 46; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
23. Bridget M. Ahmann & Erin M. Verneris, Name Brand Exposure for Generic Drug
Use: Prescription for Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 767, 769 (2009) (noting "a wave of recent
cases" involving generic drugs and the potential for brand-name manufacturers to be held liable
for injuries caused by generic drug use).
24. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), appeal denied, No.
S169116, 2009 Cal. LEXIS 233 (Cal. Jan. 21, 2009).
188 [Vol. 13:1:185
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the doctor's patients who take only the generic version. 25  That
decision, holding one company liable for its competitor's product,
sparked significant protest from brand-name drug companies. 26
In late 2009 and early 2010, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits rejected the Conte
approach.27 They held that a brand manufacturer's duty of care does
not extend to those who foreseeably rely on the listed drug's label
despite only taking the generic version of the drug.28 Rather, they
ruled that generic manufacturers were liable for any labeling
deficiencies on the theory that a generic manufacturer can change
warning labels or send "Dear Doctor" letters if they discover an
adverse drug event not found during the testing of the pioneer
product. 29 In reality, however, the FDA makes it very difficult for
generic manufacturers to amend listed drugs' warning labels which
are based on studies and data generic companies cannot obtain. 30 The
generic drug companies contended that, if required to conduct the
research necessary to support a labeling change, the cost of generics
would significantly increase, which would undermine the policies
underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act.31
In February 2010, the generic manufacturers in the Eighth
Circuit case, Mensing, filed a petition for certiorari, 32 which the
Supreme Court granted on December 10, 2010, and consolidated with
Demahy, the Fifth Circuit case. 33 The Court will likely rule one of
25. Id. at 304-05.
26. Cf. Ahmann & Verneris, supra note 23, at 780-86, 788-89 (discussing brand-name
manufacturers' concern over the possibility of being held liable when injured persons did not
even take the product they manufactured).
27. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009). A district court in the Fourth Circuit also rejected the California
approach. See Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-210-RJC-DSC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113943
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2009).
28. Mensing, 588 F.3d at 613.
29. Id. at 609-10.
30. Cf. Ahmann & Verneris, supra note 23, at 773-74.
31. Mensing, 588 F.3d at 611.
32. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Actavis Elizabeth, L.L.C. v. Mensing, 130 S. Ct.
3349 (2010) (No. 09-1039); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 130 S. Ct.
3349 (2010) (No. 09-993).
33. Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, No. 09-1039,
2010 WL 752387 (U.S. Dec 10, 2010); Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
No. 09-993, 2010 WL 621400 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010); Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Actavis Inc
v. Demahy, No. 09-1501, 010 WL 230053 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari despite the fact that the Solicitor General for the United States recommended that the
Court deny the petition. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, PLIVA, Inc., 130 S. Ct.
3349 (No. 09-993), Actavis Elizabeth, L.L.C., 130 S. Ct. 3349 (No. 09-1039), 2010 WL 4339894 at
*10. The Solicitor General argued that the Court should deny certiorari because the Eighth
Circuit correctly held that federal law did not preempt Ms. Mensing's claims, because no other
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three ways: (1) hold the generic manufacturers liable, thus
undermining the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act; (2) find the
pioneer company liable, although it did not manufacture the ingested
product; or (3) determine that an injured plaintiff has no recourse in
the judicial system, thereby leaving Congress to remedy the situation.
As this Note argues, only the last option, combined with legislative
action, would be a satisfying result.
While courts thus far have attempted to compensate injured
plaintiffs by either holding the brand-name manufacturer liable for
injuries caused by a competitor's product, or holding the generic
manufacturer liable for label deficiencies it did not create, this Note
will discuss alternative ways in which to redress injured individuals.
Part I will discuss the regulatory framework that governs approval of
pioneer and generic drugs, provide an overview of the relevant tort
principles, and address the federal preemption landscape after the
Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine.34 Part 11 will analyze
the impact of recent, conflicting court opinions on the pharmaceutical
industry and tort law. Part III will propose three solutions: (1)
clarifying the role of generic drug manufacturers in the label
formation and amendment process by the FDA; (2) labeling of generic
drugs by the FDA; and (3) creating a federal trust fund, similar to the
Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund,35 to compensate plaintiffs
who prove deficiencies in generic drug labels.
I. GENERIC DRUG WARNINGS
A. Regulatory Framework
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the FDA
regulates the manufacture, sale, and labeling of prescription drugs. 36
Congress has charged the FDA with ensuring that prescription drugs
are "safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof,"37 as well
as properly branded.38 Misbranding means labeling that is "false or
misleading in any particular" way, or which contains inadequate
warnings or directions for use.39 The FDCA further defines "labeling"
circuit had held otherwise, and because "the interlocutory posture of [the] case makes it
unsuitable for review." Id. at 11, 22, 23.
34. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2006).
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (2006).
37. Id. § 355(d).
38. Id. § 355(b), (d).
39. Id. § 352(a), (f).
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as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matters (1) upon
any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying
such article."40
1. Pre-Approval Requirements for Brand-Name Drugs
To market a "new" 41 prescription drug, a brand-name
pharmaceutical manufacturer must submit a New Drug Application
(NDA), accompanied by extensive clinical and scientific studies
verifying the drug's safety and effectiveness. 4 2 NDAs must include,
among other disclosures: full reports of safety and efficacy
investigations; a complete list of the components of the drug; a full
statement of the composition of the drug; "a full description of the
methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the
manufacture, processing, and packaging of such drug;" samples of the
drug and its components; and "specimens of the labeling."43 The drug
label must include detailed directions for appropriate use, warnings,
precautions, and adverse reactions. 44 If the FDA approves the NDA,
the agency includes the drug on its published list of approved drugs
and designates it a "listed drug."4 5 Thereafter, the innovator has the
exclusive right to sell the drug for a limited period of time, depending
on the expiration date of the patent.46
2. Post-Approval Requirements for Brand-Name Drugs
Even after receiving FDA approval, brand-name manufacturers
must continue to monitor, assess, and report adverse effects associated
with the drug.4 7 Approved NDA applicants must review all published
literature, send annual reports to the FDA detailing any new findings,
and inform the FDA of any adverse effects reported with the drug's
use.4 8 Manufacturers must also propose labeling changes based on
40. Id. § 321(m).
41. The FDCA defines a "new drug" as one qualified experts at the time of the 1962
amendments to the Act do not generally recognize as safe and effective "for use under the
condition prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof' or that has not been
used to a "material extent or for a material time" under these conditions. Id. § 321(p). As a
result, virtually all drugs approved over the last 50 years are "new."
42. Id. 355(a)-(i).
43. Id. § 355(b)(1).
44. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2010).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i), (j)(7).
46. See id. § 355(b)(1) (requiring a NDA to include the patent number and the expiration
date of any patent).
47. See id. § 355(k); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80-.81.
48. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80(a), 314.81.
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newly acquired information, 49 as risks often appear only after the drug
has been used by a larger patient population and for a longer duration
than in the clinical trials.50 Additionally, for certain drugs, the FDA
may mandate that the pioneer manufacturer commit to conducting
Phase IV clinical trials-post-marketing studies that collect additional
information including a drug's risks, benefits, and best uses-to
ensure its safety after approval.5 1 Whenever a manufacturer receives
''reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a
drug," the label must be changed, even though "a causal relationship
need not have been proved."52 To ensure that drugs which do not meet
these standards are removed from the market, the FDCA also grants
the FDA broad enforcement powers. 53
For any drug labeling change, pioneer companies must obtain
the permission of the FDA.54 If the change is "major," the
manufacturer must obtain prior FDA approval by filing a "prior
approval supplement."55  "Moderate changes," however, can be
implemented before the FDA formally approves them through a
Changes Being Effected (CBE) supplement, 56 but still must ultimately
pass FDA review.57
49. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).
50. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2009).
51. Vanessa Eng, Note, Drug Safety: It's a Learning Process, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 159, 160 (2009). Phase IV trials are post-marketing studies, after a drug is approved,
which determine additional information including a drug's risks, benefits, and best uses. U.S.
Nat'l Insts. of Health, Glossary, CLINIcALTRIALS.GOV, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/glossary
(last visited Nov. 3, 2010). If such trials reveal harmful effects, the FDA may take a drug off the
market or restrict its use. Matthew Avery, Personalized Medicine and Rescuing "Unsafe" Drugs
with Pharmacogenomics: A Regulatory Perspective, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 37, 60 (2010).
52. 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 331(b), (c), and (g) prohibit the misbranding of drugs sold in interstate
commerce, as well as the receipt or manufacture of those misbranded drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 331(b),
(c), (g) (2006). § 333 details the criminal and civil penalties for violating § 331. Id. § 333. § 355(e)
describes the processes by which the FDA will withdraw approval for a drug application. Id. §
355(e). If the Secretary finds that an imminent public health hazard exists, he may withdraw
approval immediately. Id. Barring immediate danger, the FDA may also withdraw approval,
after giving the applicant due notice and opportunity for a hearing, if it finds:
that on the basis of new information before [the agency], evaluated together with the
evidence available . . . when the application was approved, the labeling of such drug,
based on a fair evaluation of all material facts, is false or misleading in any particular
and was not corrected within a reasonable time after receipt of written notice from the
Secretary specifying the matter complained of.
Id.
54. Ahmann & Verneris, supra note 23, at 771.
55. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b).
56. Id. § 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii)(A)-(D).
57. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2009). Though not an exhaustive
list, such major changes include alterations to the drug substance or production process with the
significant possibility of adversely affecting the identity, strength, purity, or potency of a drug
relating to safety or effectiveness and major label changes. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b). In contrast,
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3. Pre- and Post-Approval Requirements for Generic Drugs
To foster prompt and effective competition, the Hatch-Waxman
Act provides for FDA approval upon satisfaction of regulatory
requirements significantly less costly and more expedient than the
FDA demands of brand-name drugs.58 Generic manufacturers must
submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), 59
demonstrating bioequivalence to the listed drug,60 but need not
conduct any further safety studies. 61 To ensure uniformity, the ANDA
must contain a side-by-side comparison of the proposed label with that
of the approved brand-name drug.62
As a further incentive to manufacture generic drugs, the Act
provides that the first approved ANDA filer to prove either invalidity
or non-infringement of the pioneer patent receives a 180-day period
during which only that filer can sell a generic version of the listed
drug.63 During that time, the first ANDA filer shares the market only
with the brand-name manufacturer. Such limited competition can
obviously benefit the generic drug company financially.64 Following
approval, the generic drug manufacturers must continue to monitor,
analyze, and report adverse effects. 65
Significantly, FDA regulations do not mention whether or how
generic manufacturers should make labeling changes after approval.66
In fact, the FDA has repeatedly declined to create a mechanism for
generic drug manufacturers to offer additional warnings or safety-
moderate changes include, but are not limited to, alterations to the drug substance or production
process with a moderate possibility of adversely affecting the identity, strength, purity, or
potency of a drug relating to safety or effectiveness and many label changes, such as
strengthening warnings, deleting misleading or unsupported indications for use, or
strengthening dosage or administration instructions. Id. § 314.70(c).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); see Carrier, supra note 16, at 41-43.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA): Generics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/abbreviat
ednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/default.htm (last visited Nov, 3, 2010).
60. "Bioequivalence means the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent
to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical
alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar
dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study." 21 C.F.R. § 320. 1(e).
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
62. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(i), (iv).
63. Liu, supra note 1, at 449.
64. See id. at 450.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.81, 314.98. Generic manufacturers must also
review published literature about the drug. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80(b), (d), 314.81(b).
66. See Suchira Ghosh, Federal Preemption and Labeling: Where Product Liability
Collides with FDA, FOOD & DRUG L. INS. UPDATE, July/Aug. 2010, at 10-13.
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related information,67 declaring that the generic drug's labeling "must
be the same as the listed drug product's labeling because the listed
drug product is the basis for ANDA approval."68 As recently as 2006,
the FDA, in revising its labeling requirements, reiterated that
"[rievised labeling for ANDA products depends on the labeling for the
reference listed drug" and that "the labeling of a drug product
submitted for approval under an ANDA must be the same as the
labeling of the listed drug. . . ."69 Furthermore, in 2008, the FDA
confirmed, once again, that generic manufacturers cannot alter
warning labels even under the Changes Being Effected process; even
after approval, the "generic manufacturer is required to conform to the
approved labeling for the listed [pioneer] drug."70
B. Products Liability
While products liability law differs among jurisdictions, most
state courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance.71
Moreover, the modest differences among common-law principles
governing alleged deficiencies in generic drug labels are far from
dispositive. Because state courts focus on similar issues, this Note
presents only a brief overview of the relevant principles.
The typical generic drug labeling case turns on failure-to-warn
and misrepresentation claims sounding in negligence. 72 To recover on
a failure-to-warn theory, the plaintiff must prove that a manufacturer
"did not warn of a particular risk for reasons which fell below the
acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent
manufacturer would have known and warned about."7 3 A plaintiff
may prevail on a misrepresentation claim by proving either negligent
or intentional conduct. 74  For intentional misrepresentation, the
67. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,884
(proposed July10, 1989).
68. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (April
28, 1992) ( to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, 433). The FDA stated that
"[c]onsistent labeling will assure physicians, health professionals, and consumers that a generic
drug is as safe and effective as its brand-name counterpart." Id.
69. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products-Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3961, 3963 (Jan. 24, 2006).
70. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 3 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2848 n.1. (Jan. 16, 2008), issued as a Final
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603 (Aug. 22, 2008).
71. See, e.g., Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
72. See id.; see also Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v.
Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 3:09-cv-210-RJC-DSC, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 113943 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2009).
73. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310, 311 (1965).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 provides that one "who makes a
misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical harm
which results" from "reliance upon the truth of the representation, if
the actor . . . intends his statement to induce or should realize that it
is likely to induce action . .. which involves an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to the other."75 For negligent misrepresentation, § 311
provides that an actor "who negligently gives false information to
another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken
by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such
harm results . . . to such third persons as the actor should expect to be
put in peril by the action taken."7 6 Finally, where cases involve
prescription drugs, the "learned-intermediary doctrine"77 teaches that
the duty to warn runs from the brand-name manufacturer to the
prescribing physician-not the patient.78
C. Federal Preemption
From the submission of an initial draft label in the ANDA to
final approval of the drug and its label, the FDA controls every word,
comma, and typeface employed. 79 Not surprisingly, drug companies
often assert, while defending against failure-to-warn claims, that the
FDA caused their allegedly tortious conduct.80 In the 2009 case of
Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court grappled with the preemption
issue-as it applied to a pioneer drug-but failed to clearly answer
whether preemption provides a viable defense for generic
manufacturers."' Even after Levine, defendants in similar cases
75. Id. § 310.
76. Id.§ 311.
77. With respect to medical prescriptions, the "learned-intermediary doctrine" provides
that "if adequate warning of potential dangers of a drug has been given to doctors, there is no
duty by the drug manufacturer to [cnsure that the warning reaches the doctor's patient for
whom the drug is prescribed." Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308 n.5 (citing Stevens v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78. Id.
79. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2006).
80. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199 (2009) ("Wyeth contends that the
FDCA establishes both a floor and a ceiling for drug regulation: Once the FDA has approved a
drug's label, a state-law verdict may not deem the label inadequate, regardless of whether there
is any evidence that the FDA has considered the stronger warning at issue."); Demahy v.
Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Here, Actavis urges that federal law requires
that it maintain at all times a label that is the "same as" the name brand's, thus preventing
simultaneous compliance with a state law requiring additional warnings."); Mensing v. Wyeth,
Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[Tjhe generic manufacturers argue they are prohibited
from implementing a unilateral label change without prior FDA approval through the CBE
process.").
81. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
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continue to move for summary judgment, asserting that federal law
preempts the plaintiffs' claims.82
The Court has recognized two kinds of preemption: express and
implied. 83  Express preemption exists when Congress specifically
states its intention for a statute to preempt conflicting state law. 84
Implied preemption occurs when Congress has not explicitly declared
a desire to preempt, but its actions nonetheless effectively preempt
state law. Implied preemption, in turn, further separates into conflict
and field preemption. 85  Conflict preemption occurs "where it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
law," or where a state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."86 Field preemption arises when a "scheme of federal
regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."87
In Levine, the Supreme Court held, as a general rule, that the
FDCA does not preempt failure-to-warn claims against brand-name
manufacturers. The Court found that petitioner had presented no
"clear evidence" that the FDA had precluded-or would preclude-
Wyeth from issuing a stronger warning.88 The Levine plaintiff sued
Wyeth after a nurse injected the drug Phenergan directly into her
artery, causing gangrene and the eventual amputation of her arm,
ending her career as a professional musician.89 Ms. Levine alleged
that the label failed to warn physicians of the foreseeable risks of
gangrene likely to occur with the dangerous IV-push method.90 Wyeth
responded that federal law preempted this failure-to-warn claim
because the FDA had approved the drug's label, which warned of the
risk, but not as clearly as the plaintiff alleged that the law required.91
Specifically, Wyeth argued that it could not possibly "comply
with the state-law duty to modify Phenergan's labeling without
violating federal law" and that Levine's state tort action thus
82. See, e.g., Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. No. 09-15001, 2011 WL 198420 (9th Cir. Jan. 24,
2011); Demahy, 593 F.3d 428; Mensing, 588 F.3d 603; Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 3:09-cv-210-RJC-
DSC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113943 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2009); Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299.




86. Lockwood, supra note 2, at 150-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 150.
88. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009).
89. Id. at 1191.
90. Id. at 1192.
91. See id.
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frustrated "the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 92 The Court,
in rejecting both arguments, focused on the long-term coexistence of
state tort remedies and federal regulation of prescription drugs. 93 The
majority explained that if Congress had thought state law tort actions
would encumber its purposes, "it surely would have enacted an
express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA's 70-
year history."94 The Court further declared that Congress's "silence on
the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state
tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA
oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness."95
Both before and after the Levine decision, generic and brand-
name manufacturers have asserted conflict preemption as a defense to
failure-to-warn claims, and a growing number of federal district courts
have split on the issue.96 Thus far, the circuit courts have generally
followed Levine by rejecting generic manufacturers' preemption
claims, despite the fact that Levine dealt only with brand-name
manufacturers. 9 7  For example, in Mensing, the Eighth Circuit
pondered, "After Levine, we must view with a questioning mind the
generic defendants' argument that Congress silently intended to grant
the manufacturers of most prescription drugs blanket immunity from
state tort liability when they market inadequately labeled products."98
As a result of Levine and its rejection of the preemption defense,
courts appear set on holding someone responsible when plaintiffs are
92. Id. at 1193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 1200.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. District court cases finding state law preempted include: Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms.
Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration); Smith
v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2009 WL 425032 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2009); Morris v. Wyeth,
Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Ky. 2009); Wilson v. Pliva, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 879 (W.D. Ky.
2009); Masterson v. Apotex, Corp., No. 07-61665-CIV, 2008 WL 3262690 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008).
District courts finding no preemption include: Munroe v. Barr Labs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1299
(N.D. Fla. 2009); Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D.N.H. 2009); Stacel v.
Teva Pharms., 620 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 421 (D. Vt.
2008); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (reversing its
earlier ruling dismissing the case on preemption grounds); Barnhill v. Teva Pharms., No. 06-
0282-CB-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44718 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007).
97. See, e.g., Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. No. 09-15001, 2011 WL 198420 (9th Cir. Jan. 24,
2011) (reversing the district court judgment that plaintiffs claims were preempted); Pustejovsky
v. Pliva, Inc., No. 10-10983, slip op. at 5, 9 (5th Cir. Oct. 8, 2010) (finding plaintiffs state law
claims not preempted by the Hatch-Waxman Act and affirming district court grant of summary
judgment in favor of Pliva).; Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010), Mensing v.
Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009).
98. Mensing, 588 F.3d at 607.
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injured by the prescription drugs they consume. 99  Which
manufacturer the courts hold liable has important implications for
tort law and the healthcare industry.
II. ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY
A. Conte: Brand-Name Manufacturer Bears the Loss
In Conte, the plaintiff alleged that she developed tardive
dyskinesia, an irreversible neurological condition, as a result of taking
metoclopramide, the chemical equivalent to Reglan.100 Ms. Conte
alleged that Wyeth, the pioneer manufacturer of the drug, had failed
to warn her adequately of known adverse effects that could occur with
long-term use. 101  The California trial court granted summary
judgment for Wyeth. 102 It reasoned that Conte could not demonstrate
that her physician had actually relied on the warnings drafted by
Wyeth for Reglan and that an innovator manufacturer has no legal
duty to patients who take the generic version of its drug.103 The
California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a brand-name
manufacturer's common-law duty to exercise due care when providing
warnings extends beyond consumers of its own drug to patients whose
doctors foreseeably rely on the innovator's warning when prescribing
the generic version. 104
Ms. Conte alleged that Wyeth misrepresented the risks of long-
term use in its warning label and in the Reglan monograph it
submitted to the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR), an annual
publication containing pharmaceutical product information. 105
Although she never ingested Wyeth's product, she argued that Wyeth
should be found liable because her doctor relied on Wyeth's warning
when prescribing Reglan. 106 Wyeth countered that her doctor testified
99. See Demahy, 593 F.3d 428; Mensing, 588 F.3d 603; Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:09-
cv-210-RJC-DSC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113943 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2009); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.,85
Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. App. 2009).
100. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304-05.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 306.
103. See id. at 305-06.
104. Id. at 304-05.
105. Id. at 307-08. Drug manufacturers provide information to the PDR, and the FDA
approves it. Id. at 308 n.4. Licensed physicians in the United States and around the world
receive the PDR for free each year. Id. An entry generally includes the trade and chemical names
and description of a drug, indications and contraindications for use, warnings, adverse reactions,
and dosage and administration information. Id.
106. Id. at 307-08.
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he did not rely on its warnings. 107 The appellate court found a factual
dispute sufficient to deny summary judgment because the doctor had
often relied on the PDR during his residency and had "probably" read
the entry for Reglan. 0 8
Noting that the case presented an issue of first impression in
California, the court of appeals rejected the trial court's reasoning. 109
Wyeth argued that the products liability claim masqueraded as one of
fraud and misrepresentation, and that Conte could not prevail on a
theory of strict liability because Wyeth did not produce or market the
product that caused her injury.110 The court of appeals, however,
noted that Ms. Conte had alleged a products liability-not a failure-to-
warn-claim, namely that "that Wyeth failed to use due care when
disseminating its product information."111 The court of appeals found
it foreseeable that pharmacists would fill a prescription for Reglan,
written in reliance on its label, with metoclopramide, which the
statutes of California-as in most states-authorize pharmacists to
do.112 The court of appeals further reasoned that a physician could
foreseeably prescribe metoclopramide in reliance on the Reglan label
due to the chemical equivalence of the two drugs.113
Wyeth also made a number of policy arguments, all of which
the court of appeals rejected. 11 4  The court disagreed with the
contention that imposing liability "would chill innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry."115 The court acknowledged, but refused to
evaluate, the potentially unbounded liability that Wyeth might incur
from an adverse holding: "as the foreseeable risk of physical harm
runs to users of both Brand-name and generic drugs, so too runs the
duty of care." 16
Finally, the court of appeals refused to follow the Fourth
Circuit's 1994 decision in Foster v. American Home Products,"7 which
unequivocally found that innovator manufacturers could not be held
107. Id. at 308-09.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 305, 309.
110. Id. at 309.
111. Id. at 310. Under strict products liability, the standard of due care or reasonableness
of a manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant. Id. A plaintiff need only prove "that the defendant did
not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally
recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of
manufacture and distribution." Id.
112. Id. at 313.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 314.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 314-15.
117. Id. at 315.
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liable for injuries from generic drug use under theories of
misrepresentation. 118 Foster involved the death of an infant from
promethazine, which Wyeth (then American Home Products)
manufactured as Phenergan (coincidentally the same drug involved in
Levine).119 The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' negligence claim
against Wyeth based on its labeling because imposing such a duty
would "stretch the concept of foreseeability too far."120 The court
concluded that Wyeth owed the Fosters no duty because Wyeth did not
manufacture the product that caused the injury.121
The Conte trial court agreed with the Foster court's policy
rationale: Because a generic manufacturer benefits by "riding the
coattails" of the brand-name manufacturer, which expends immense
resources to develop, test, and label an innovative drug, it would
unfairly burden the pioneer to bear the liability for harm caused by
the generic. 122 Indeed, the trial court deemed it unfair "to hold the
pioneer manufacturer liable as insurer for not only its own production
but also its generic competitors, especially when the latter enjoys the
full financial benefits but no risk regarding the product."123
The Conte appellate court disagreed, however, finding the
Foster reasoning "circular" and refusing to apply it.124 The appellate
court asked, "[W]hat is unfair about requiring a defendant to shoulder
its share of responsibility for injuries caused, at least in part, by its
negligent or intentional dissemination of inaccurate information?" 12 5
It added that the pioneer manufacturer "enjoys unique advantages,
such as the initial period of patent protection from competition, the
fiscal rewards of Brand-name recognition and the commensurate
ability to charge a higher price for its product."126 Declining to reach
the preemption issue, the court of appeals found the risk of injury
foreseeable, lest it "ignore the reality of the breadth and effect of
Wyeth's representations in modern commerce and depart from firmly
established principles of fault-based tort liability."127
The Conte decision sparked concern among commentators
regarding the extent to which brand-name manufacturers could be
exposed, at least in California, to liability for drugs produced by their
118. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 167; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009).
120. Id. at 170-71.
121. Id.
122. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 316 (citing Foster, 29 F.3d at 170).
123. Id. at 316-17.
124. Id. at 316.
125. Id. at 317.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 320-21.
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generic competitors. 128 Commentators found it especially troubling
that the court's speculation that the prescribing doctor had "probably"
read Reglan's monograph in the PDR was sufficient to defeat
summary judgment. 129 More recently, however, the federal courts
have criticized and declined to follow Conte, opting instead to hold
generic manufacturers liable, despite their lack of control over the
labels they copy from the original manufacturer. 130
B. Mensing: Brand-Name Manufacturer Does Not Bear the Loss
On facts remarkably similar to those in Conte, Gladys Mensing
sued Wyeth and generic manufacturers in federal court in 2009,
claiming both failure to warn and misrepresentation, and alleging
that she, too, had developed tardive dyskinesia as a result of taking
metoclopramide. 131 The district court entered summary judgment,
both for the generic manufacturers-holding the claims federally
preempted-and for the brand-name manufacturers-because Ms.
Mensing did not take Reglan. 132 Mensing appealed, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the pioneer companies, but
reversed as to their generic competitors. 133
The Eighth Circuit rejected the generic defendants' preemption
argument, relying on the Levine opinion, which was issued after the
Mensing verdict. "After Wyeth [v. Levine], we must view with a
questioning mind the generic defendants' argument that Congress
silently intended to grant the manufacturers of most prescription
drugs blanket immunity from state tort liability when they market
inadequately labeled products."134 After Levine, almost all courts
faced with tort claims against generic manufacturers have refused to
find preemption.135
Because generic labels must copy those of pioneers before and
after FDA approval, generic companies argued that they could not
implement a unilateral change to a drug's label without prior FDA
128. See, e.g., Ahmann & Verneris, supra note 26, at 789.
129. See id.
130. See infra Part II.B-C.
131. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 2009). On February 26, 2009, the
FDA, acting on its own initiative under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, ordered manufacturers of Reglan and generic metoclopramide to add a black box warning
to labels about the increased risks of tardive dyskinesia from long-term metoclopramide use. Id.
at 606 n.2.
132. Id. at 604.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 607.
135. Id. (citing Stacel v. Teva Pharms., 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906-07 (N.D. Ill. 2009);
Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1265-66 (W.D. Okla. 2009)).
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approval through the CBE procedure. 136 The Eighth Circuit, however,
declined to decide whether generic manufacturers could unilaterally
change a label through the CBE process because they "could have at
least proposed a label change that the FDA could receive and impose
uniformly on all metoclopramide manufacturers if approved." 137 The
FDA does mandate that generic labels "shall be revised as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with
a drug."138  Generic manufacturers argue that they comply with
federal regulations by ensuring their label exactly matches that of the
brand-name drug.139 Quoting Levine, the Eighth Circuit stated, "The
FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the
market ... . [M]anufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary
responsibility for their drug labeling."140 The FDA, in commentary
published shortly after the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
wrote that after FDA approval of an ANDA, when the generic
company holding the application "believes that new safety information
should be added, it should provide adequate supporting information to
FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic
and listed drugs should be revised." 141
The Eighth Circuit noted that generic manufacturers must
record and report adverse drug events after approval just as brand-
name manufacturers do, and the regulations stating this requirement
mention the initiation of labeling changes. 142 "Implicit in these
comments is the FDA's expectation that generic manufacturers will
initiate label changes other than those made to mirror changes to the
brand-name label and that the agency will attempt to approve such
proposals quickly."143  The Eighth Circuit also emphasized that
nothing in the FDCA or the Hatch-Waxman Act "explicitly forbids
[generics] from proposing a label change through the prior approval
process."144
136. Id. at 608.
137. Id.
138. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2010).
139. Mensing, 588 F.3d at 609.
140. Id. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009)).
141. Id. (citing Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950,
17,961 cmt.40 (Apr. 28, 1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 320, 433) (emphasis
added)).
142. Id. (citing Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,965
cmt.53 ("ANDA applicants [must] submit a periodic report of adverse drug experiences even if
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The generic defendants had argued that the prior approval
process under § 314.70 is for "major changes," while the CBE
procedure deals with merely enhanced warnings, but the court found
this reading too limited. 145  Rather, the court declared that the
section's repeated use of "[t]hese changes include, but are not limited
to," to describe the kinds of changes that manufacturers can
recommend suggests that the potential types of changes under each
procedure may be quite broad and that neither Congress nor the FDA
intended to prohibit generics from offering label changes for prior
approval.146 The Eighth Circuit also noted that generic companies
could have recommended that the FDA send "Dear Doctor" letters to
warn prescribing physicians of the risks of long-term Reglan use.147
The preemption issue in Mensing was whether generic
manufacturers could comply with the state law duty to warn and the
FDCA.148 Because the district court did not know how the FDA would
have responded had a generic manufacturer recommended a label
change, it refrained from imposing liability.149 The Eighth Circuit,
however, guided by Levine, stated that ambiguity about the FDA's
reaction "makes federal preemption less likely."150 In this case, no
clear evidence about the FDA's potential response existed. 51 As in
Levine, the Eighth Circuit doubted that "the FDA would bring an
enforcement action against a manufacturer for strengthening a
warning pursuant to the CBE regulation,"152 and the generic
manufacturers could not provide an example of the "FDA even
threaten[ing] an enforcement action against a generic manufacturer
for unilaterally enhancing its label warnings."153
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the generic defendants' policy
argument concerning the expense of undertaking scientific studies
required to make a label change. 154 The court first declared that if the
generic companies realized that the label needed strengthening, but
believed they lacked authority to do so, they could have simply
stopped selling the drug. 55 The court also noted that no regulation
145. Id.
146. Id. at 609-10 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2), (c)(2), (d)(2) (2010)).
147. Id. at 610.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009) ("[Albsent clear evidence
that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the drug's] label, we will not conclude that it
was impossible for [the manufacturer] to comply with both federal and state requirements.")).
151. Id. at 611.
152. Id. at 610-11 n.6 (citing Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1197).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 611-12.
155. Id. at 611.
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mandates that manufacturers conduct expensive clinical studies. 156
Indeed, in Levine, the Supreme Court declared that even receiving
multiple reports of an adverse drug reaction "provided the scientific
substantiation to justify a manufacturer's request to change a
label."1 5 7 The Eighth Circuit found that because generic and brand-
name manufacturers must track and report adverse drug events, they
could change their labels based on those reports.158
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit articulated its desire to hold
someone responsible for Ms. Mensing's injury, stating that "[the
Hatch-Waxman Act] provided for cheaper, expedited approval of
generic drugs, not relief from the fundamental requirement of the
FDCA that all marketed drugs remain safe."159 The court added, "we
decline to assume that Congress intended to shield from tort liability
the manufacturers of the majority of the prescription drugs consumed
in this country and leave injured parties like Mensing no legal
remedy."160 However, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Foster court
that it could not hold the pioneer manufacturer liable for Ms.
Mensing's injury, and found that a "majority of courts considering this
issue"161 have ruled that "holding name brand manufacturers liable
for harm caused by generic manufacturers 'stretch[es] the concept of
foreseeability too far."'
1 6 2
C. Demahy: Generic Manufacturer Bears the Loss
In early 2010, the Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning of
Mensing to decide a case on similar facts.163 Julie Demahy sued
Actavis, yet another generic manufacturer of metoclopramide, after
156. Id. at 611-12.
157. Id. at 612 (citing Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1197).
158. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 314.98 (2010)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 613.
162. Id. (citing Foster v. Am. Home Prods., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994)). In late 2009,
in Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., another plaintiff sued both brand-name and generic manufacturers in
district court for injuries resulting from her use of the generic form of Reglan. Couick v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. 3:09-cv-210-RJC-DSC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113943, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2009).
One of the defendants, generic manufacturer Actavis, made arguments similar to those by the
generic defendants in Mensing, and the court, frequently citing Mensing, rejected these
preemption arguments. See id. at *6-10. After noting that "there are strong arguments on both
sides regarding whether a generic drug manufacturer can use a CBE supplement to change its
label," the district court stated that Actavis could not show that federal law prevented it from
making changes to its labels or warning physicians in some other way about the dangers of the
drug. Id. at *9-10. The district court did not reach the question whether generic manufacturers
can avail themselves of the CBE procedure as a matter of law. Id. at *13.
163. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010).
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she, too, developed tardive dyskinesia as a result of taking the generic
form of Reglan.164 Actavis moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims
were conflict preempted, but the district court denied the motion with
respect to the failure-to-warn claims.166 The Fifth Circuit affirmed,
emphasizing the high bar required for preemption, which otherwise
would "foreclose a remedy that was traditionally available and for
which federal law provides no substitute." 166
The Fifth Circuit echoed the Mensing court's reasoning that
manufacturers, both generic and brand-name, bear responsibility for
the accuracy of their warning labels and the safety of their products.167
Agreeing with the expansive interpretation of generics' power to
change labels in Mensing, the Fifth Circuit noted that, at a minimum,
the generic manufacturer should inform the FDA about new safety
hazards associated with its product. 168 Actavis argued that if it
changed the label on its own, it would risk FDA withdrawal of
approval because its label would no longer mimic the brand-name
label.169 However, the court concluded that FDA regulations indicate
that the threat of withdrawal of approval was meant to ensure that
generic manufacturers continued to revise labels in accordance with
changes brand-name manufacturers made, not to prevent generic
manufacturers from strengthening their own labels. 170
Demahy responded that Actavis could have complied with both
FDA regulations and state warning laws by following the CBE
process, the prior approval process, or by sending warnings directly to
physicians.171 On their face, neither the Hatch-Waxman Act nor the
CBE regulation distinguishes generic from brand-name
manufacturers or prohibits generic manufacturers from using the
CBE procedure to change their labels unilaterally.17 2 Ultimately, the
FDA regulations are ambiguous because they do not discuss label
changes post-approval.17 3 The Fifth Circuit refused to read into the
regulations a prohibition barring generic manufacturers from
following the CBE process, which would indeed prevent generics from
revising their labels. 74 Although Actavis contended that recent FDA
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 435, 449.
167. Id. at 437.
168. Id. at 438.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 439.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 441.
174. Id. at 444.
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statements supported a preemption argument, the court responded, as
had the Mensing court, that the FDA formally withdrew those
statements after Levine.175 The Fifth Circuit also refused to hold that
the FDCA or the Hatch-Waxman Act prevented generics from
participating in the prior approval process.176 Finally, the court held
that Actavis could have recommended that the FDA send "Dear
Doctor" letters to prescribing physicians.177 While manufacturers
must receive prior approval from the FDA to send such letters, the
FDA can send them "if it determines that they are a necessary part of
a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy."178
Actavis argued that conducting the studies necessary to justify
a label change would subvert the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
but the Fifth Circuit responded that no regulation mentions a
requirement that drug manufacturers undertake such studies.179 The
court found that the FDA does not mandate a causal relationship
before revising a label, 180 and, in fact, expects "reasonable evidence" to
come from sources such as "new clinical studies, reports of adverse
events, or new analyses of previously submitted data (e.g., meta-
analyses)."181 Again following Levine, the Demahy court found
insufficient evidence "to overcome the presumption against
preemption; that is, there is no evidence sufficient for us to say that it
was the 'clear and manifest purpose' of Congress to preempt state law,
or to allow the FDA to do the same."18 2 The Fifth Circuit, raising the
possibility of legislative action, concluded: "The preservation of our
federalism requires Congress to do more than it-or the FDA-has
chosen to do here ... The need for supplanting state duties here and
the attendant calibration of costs and benefits are far beyond judicial
ken . ... "183
III. PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE
As courts have now noted in many opinions, the label-change
procedures available to generic manufacturers are ambiguous, leaving
175. Id. at 443.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 444 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(2) (2006)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 447.
180. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.80(e), 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2010)).
181. Id. (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs, Biological and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,604 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814)).
182. Id. at 449.
183. Id.
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courts to infer the intent of Congress and the FDA.184 The California
Court of Appeals has been rightly criticized for imposing, in Conte,
liability on manufacturers for the deficient products of their generic
competitors, and its holding raises questions about basic product
liability principles.185 The more recent opinions in the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits186 pose problems of their own by saddling liability on
generic manufacturers that wield little or no control over label
content, and by undermining the shortcuts Congress provided in the
Hatch-Waxman Act.187 The Supreme Court, after hearing argument
in Mensing in March 2011,188 could hold the generic manufacturers
liable as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have already done, 189 find the
pioneer company liable as did the Conte court,190 or determine that an
injured plaintiff has no judicial recourse, thereby leaving Congress to
remedy the situation.
Because the FDA requires many brand-name drug companies
to conduct post-approval Phase IV studies to better quantify known
problems and detect new risks not observed in the smaller-scale, pre-
approval clinical trials, 191 generic manufacturers may possess less
research data than the pioneer companies. 192 Generic drug companies
cannot access brand-name Phase IV data when they begin selling
their generic drugs1 93 and they "never accumulate the universe of data
regarding a particular drug product" that the FDA and the brand-
name manufacturer possess. 194 Although generic drug companies
keep records of adverse reactions reported to them after approval,195
they possess far fewer resources than pioneer manufacturers. 19 6
Moreover, the high costs of litigation could increase the costs of
generic medicines,'97 thus defeating an important purpose of the
184. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.
187. See id.
188. See Activis Elizabeth, L.L.C. v Mensing, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/actavis-elizabeth-v-mensing/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
189. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. 31 C.F.R. § 310.303.
192. Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor's
Copycat Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 673, 682 (2010). See also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 130 S. Ct. 3349 (2010) (No. 09-993), 2010 WL 638478 at *20-
22 [hereinafter PLIVA Petition for Writ].
193. Noah, supra note 192, at 682.
194. PLIVA Petition for Writ at *21.
195. Id. at *20-21.
196. Id. at *21.
197. See id.
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Hatch-Waxman Act. 198 Given the reluctance by the judiciary to infer
preemption in the absence of explicit congressional intent, Congress
and the FDA should address these issues to provide fair and efficient
compensation to those harmed by generic drugs, without undermining
the intended benefits of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Section A of this Part discusses how Congress and the FDA
should authorize generic manufacturers to warn consumers of risks
associated with their products. Section B of this Part proposes a novel
solution to the dilemma of which manufacturer should shoulder
liability for harm caused by generic drugs mimicking the brand-name
label: a no-fault, government trust fund similar to the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Fund. 199
A. Changing Procedures for Changing Labels
Judicial interpretations of various FDA statements reflect
confusion over the extent to which generic manufacturers can amend
warning labels on their own. Although the FDA had previously issued
statements suggesting that generic manufacturers could not amend
their warning labels on their own, the FDA withdrew them after
Levine.200 Because the FDA has not issued any clarification since
Levine, generic manufacturers continue to argue preemption, leaving
courts to divine the intent of Congress and the FDA from limited
statutory and regulatory documents. 201
Congress could follow one of two paths. First, Congress could
expressly allow generic manufacturers to make labeling changes and
provide explicit instructions for doing so. Second, Congress could
198. Lockwood, supra note 2, at 147.
199. See 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2006).
200. The FDA formally withdrew its amicus briefs in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated,
129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009). The other FDA statement was a footnote in the "Supplementary
Information" section of a notice of proposed rulemaking for a regulation not pertaining to generic
drugs, noting that "CBE changes are not available for generic drugs." Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg.
2848, 2849 n.1 (proposed Jan. 16, 2008). The FDA likely withdrew these statements in response
to a Presidential Memorandum entitled "Preemption" that President Obama sent to executive
and department and agency heads on May 20, 2009. Lawrence S. Ebner, President Obama's
"Preemption Memo": Much to Do About Very Little, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, June 19, 2009. The
memorandum was meant to ensure that any preemptive regulations, including those
promulgated in the last decade, are "justified under legal principles governing preemption." Id.
The memorandum also mandated that any intent to preempt state law must be issued in a
"codified regulation" through notice-and-comment rulemaking, rather than in Federal Register
regulations. Id.
201. See discussion supra Part II.
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authorize the FDA to manage labeling and generate drug labels on its
own.
1. Granting Generics More Control
Generic companies justify their reluctance to initiate label
changes on their fear of liability for failure to warn, concern that FDA
approval could be rescinded, and lack of complete information as to
potential dangers of the drug.2 0 2 To address these concerns, Congress
could amend 21 C.F.R §§ 314.70 and 314.97 to explicitly allow generic
manufacturers to initiate label changes through the prior approval
process and the CBE procedure. A generic manufacturer who does not
initiate a label change once a reasonably dangerous adverse reaction
becomes known might then be held liable for a failure to warn.
This approach, however, is not ideal. As noted above, given
their extensive pre- and post-approval clinical testing, brand-name
manufacturers are better positioned to revise warning labels than
generic drug companies, which must rely on sporadic adverse drug
reports and meta-analyses of other clinical studies. 203 The potential
for liability could also cause generics to initiate label changes for any
remotely dangerous condition associated with the drug. This would
lead to confusing differences in warning labels, not only between
generics and brand-name drugs, but also among generics. As both the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the longstanding FDA regulations recognize,
all versions of the same drug should have the same label; different
labels could cause doctor confusion.204 Finally, these label changes
require resources that might increase the costs of generic drugs, thus
undermining the purpose behind making the drug approval process
easier for generic drug companies. 205
2. Granting Generics No Control
Levine appears to carve out an exception when the FDA
compels a company to write a label a certain way, making it
impossible for a company to deviate from that label, because Congress
and the FDA endeavor to achieve an objective beyond an individual
company. 206 Therefore, Congress could expressly delegate to the FDA
the power to write all mandatory labels for generic drugs itself. The
202. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, PLIVA, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3349 (No. 09-
993).
203. Id. at *20-22.
204. See 21 U.S.C. § 355()(2)(A) (2006).
205. See Lockwood, supra note 2, at 147.
206. Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009).
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FDA would consider all known information about the drug, including
research done by the pioneer company and updates provided by
generic manufacturers as they learn of adverse drug reactions.
Committees within the FDA, as well as independent advisory
committees, would monitor the updated information. The FDA would
create a uniform label for all generic versions of a given drug. Using
the FDA-mandated label would then preempt failure-to-warn claims.
Generic manufacturers would regularly report adverse
reactions, the seriousness of which FDA advisory committees would
evaluate and then determine the need for revisions. Although FDA
administrative costs would increase somewhat, the improved safety of
each generic drug label and the continued savings in generic prices
would justify the added expense. The special case of generic drug
labeling demands such a centralized approach.
B. Immunizing Manufacturers: The "Vaccine Trust Fund" Paradigm
Because injured plaintiffs might lack a legal remedy if the FDA
responds too slowly or otherwise fails to efficiently control all labeling,
a trust fund similar to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund207
should complement the FDA-controlled labeling solution. This
combination of approaches would allow injured plaintiffs to recover
while maintaining the low costs of generic drugs and increasing the
safety of drug labels.
In 1986, Congress responded to similar concerns about plaintiff
compensation, where public health demanded quick drug
development, by enacting the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act ("Vaccine Act"). 208  The Act responded to the
decreasing supply of vaccines that resulted from increasing legal costs
and the inability of vaccine manufacturers to acquire product liability
insurance. 209  Congress intended the Vaccine Act to provide just
compensation to those injured by vaccines while guaranteeing a
steady supply of vaccines and protecting vaccine manufacturers from
undue civil liability. 210  The Act created the National Vaccine
Program, which allows federal officials to manage vaccine safety and
research to increase the effectiveness of nationwide immunization. 2 1 1
Additionally, the Act established the National Childhood Vaccine
207. 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2006).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (2006).
209. Gordon Shemin, Comment, Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and
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Injury Compensation Program, through which individuals injured by
vaccines can obtain compensation. 2 12 The Act also established the
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), implemented by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the FDA in
1990.213 The VAERS is a "passive reporting system that allows the
FDA and the CDC to monitor vaccines for possible new side effects,
identify patient risk factors for side effects, and assess the safety of
new vaccines." 214
If the vaccine alleged to have caused harm is in the Vaccine
Injury Table, a plaintiff must start in Vaccine Court, the judicial body
that determines whether an injured patient qualifies for
compensation. 2 1 5 To succeed, a petitioner or his representative must
demonstrate that he "received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury
Table;" 216 that he received the vaccine in the United States; 217 and
that he "suffered the residual effects or complications" from the injury
for more than six months, "died from the administration of the
vaccine," or his injury resulted in "hospitalization and surgical
intervention."218  Claimants must file an action within thirty-six
months of "the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or
manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such
injury."219 Most importantly, the Vaccine Act preempts state law
claims against vaccine manufacturers for vaccine-related injuries
"unless a petitioner has exhausted his remedies under the Vaccine
Act."22 0 If a claimant later sues in civil court, the Act modifies state
212. Id. at 470-71.
213. JAMES R. COPLAND & PAUL HOWARD, IN THE WAKE OF WYETH V. LEVINE: MAKING THE
CASE FOR FDA PREEMPTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION 12 (2009), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/fda -01.htm.
214. Id. More than 30,000 VAERS reports are submitted each year. Id.
215. Id.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(A) (2006).
217. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(B)(i)(I).
218. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D).
219. Id. § 300aa-16(a)(2). If the claim alleges that a vaccine caused death, the estate must
bring the action within twenty-four months of death, and within forty-eight months of the onset
of the original symptoms leading to death. Id. § 300aa-16(a)(3).
220. Shemin, supra note 209, at 472. The Vaccine Act provides: "No person may bring a
civil action for damages in an amount greater than $1,000 . . . against a vaccine administrator or
a manufacturer in a State or Federal court for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury ...
unless a petition has been filed, in accordance with section 300aa-16 of this title . . . " and the
United States Court of Federal Claims has issued a judgment under § 12 and the petitioner
rejects the judgment under § 21(a)). 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). If an injured individual files a
civil action in federal or state court, under § 11(a)(2)(B) of the Vaccine Act, that court must
dismiss the claim until the vaccinee exhausts his or her remedies under the Vaccine Program. Id.
§ 300aa-11(a)(2)(B) (instructing the receiving court to dismiss the petition).
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tort law to create additional protection for defendant vaccine
manufacturers.22 1
The Act allows for claims based on the Vaccine Injury Table,222
as well as "off-table" claims.223 The Vaccine Injury Table lists the
vaccines that the Act explicitly covers, the injuries associated with
each vaccine, and the time periods in which the first symptoms must
occur. 2 24 Meeting the requirements in the Table entitles the claimants
to a rebuttable presumption that the vaccine caused his injury.225 If
the injury does not fall within the Table, a claimant can bring suit
"off-table" and recover if he demonstrates by a preponderance of the
evidence that the vaccine actually caused the harm. 2 2 6 An off-table
claimant does not enjoy the causation presumption, rendering his
claim more speculative. 227 A successful claimant, whether on-table or
off, can recover medical expenses, lost wages, future medical care
costs, and up to $250,000 in damages for pain and suffering.228
However, plaintiffs cannot claim punitive damages and "[iln the event
of a vaccine-related death, [the Vaccine Act provides for] an award of
$250,000 for the estate of the deceased."229 Compensation comes from
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, which the Treasury
Department oversees and funds with a seventy-five cent tax on each
dose of the covered vaccines. 230
After the Vaccine Court enters a judgment, the claimant has
ninety days to decide whether to accept or reject the determination. 231
If he accepts, the Act precludes him from bringing a civil lawsuit, and,
in fact, few petitioners reject favorable judgments from the court. 232 If
he rejects the judgment, or if the court fails to make a decision within
221. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1) prohibits awarding compensation for injuries from "unavoidable"
side effects of vaccines; § 300aa-22(b)(2) establishes a presumption that the manufacturer
complied with FDA requirements for appropriate directions and warnings, and § 300aa-22(c)
forbids holding the manufacturer liable for failure to warn an injured claimant. 42 U.S.C. §
300aa-22. A compensation claim must include an affidavit and supporting documentation such
as "maternal prenatal and delivery records, newborn hospital records . . . , vaccination records
associated with the vaccine allegedly causing the injury, pre-and post-injury physician or clinic
records . . . [and] if applicable, a death certificate, and . . . autopsy results." Id. § 300aa-11(c).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14; 42 C.F.R § 100.3(a) (2010).
223. Shemin, supra note 209, at 475.
224. 42 C.F.R § 100.3(a).
225. Shemin, supra note 209, at 475.
226. Id. at 475-76.
227. Id. at 476.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (2006).
229. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2), (d)(1).
230. Shemin, supra note 209, at 477.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a).
232. Shemin, supra note 209, at 477.
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240 days, he may bring a civil lawsuit. 23 3 After a judgment by the
Vaccine Court, either the claimant or the government can appeal the
decision to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and beyond that to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.234
Between 1990 and 2009, the compensation program paid out
over $913 million on 1,086 compensated claims, suggesting
substantial awards (about $900,000 on average) for a fairly small
number of children with serious injuries.235 Significantly, only 3% of
the money paid was spent on attorneys' fees and 11% on
administrative costs, resulting in a reduction in transaction costs by
some 56% compared to the tort system."2 3 6
Commentators have suggested the wholesale substitution of a
system similar to the Vaccine Act for tort liability involving
prescription drugs, allowing for preemption of all claims against drug
manufacturers. 2 3 7  Such an approach, however, unwisely and
unnecessarily includes pioneer drug manufacturers who enjoy both a
legal patent monopoly and exclusive access to clinical studies and
post-marketing adverse drug reaction data. Once an innovator's
patent expires, however, the responsibility fragments among many
generic firms, as mandated by Congress and coordinated by the FDA.
The policy of basing label changes on science and ensuring consistency
among bioequivalent compounds suggests that the FDA should
assume the role of "labeler-in-chief." In such a world, a compensation
trust fund could provide a remedy for injured individuals while
allowing generic manufacturers to continue producing cheap drugs as
desired under the Act.
Following the template of the vaccine program, a compensation
trust fund for individuals injured by drugs produced by generic
manufacturers should carefully craft classes of covered individuals,
compensate only unforeseen adverse reactions with minor taxes on
generic drugs, cap compensation, bar punitive damages, and offer the
right to accept or appeal judgments.
A government-run compensation fund could prove successful in
the context of generic drugs because, in certain critical respects,
generic drugs resemble vaccines. Both have great public health
benefits; both are tested, developed, and marketed under thorough
FDA regulation; and both benefit the public more when promptly
233. Wendy N. Davis, The Immune Response: The Supreme Court May Tell Families with
Autistic Children Whether They Can Sue Vaccine Makers, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 2010, at 51.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e), 12(f.
235. COPLAND & HOWARD, supra note 213, at 13.
236. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. See id. at i ("We recommend that Congress broadly preempt state tort lawsuits
seeking to hold drugs and medical devices responsible for claimants' illnesses and injuries.").
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approved and competitively priced. However, where vaccines typically
prevent disease, drugs generally treat disease, rendering causation
difficult to determine because many confounding factors could
contribute to an adverse reaction. Legislators therefore need to
carefully craft classes of covered plaintiffs and injuries.
Overcompensation could cause pharmaceutical manufacturers to
decide against researching treatment of certain diseases if the risk of
injury and resulting compensation becomes too great.238 Because
these claims could be very complicated factually, legislators would also
need to account for under-compensation in creating injury tables for
plaintiffs.
The fund should only compensate individuals for unforeseen
adverse reactions, which would encourage manufacturers to tell the
FDA about side effects they discovered during normal use.2 39
Conversely, the fund should not compensate patients harmed by
foreseeable side effects that manufacturers had already warned about
on the label. 24 0 To discourage manufacturers from adding too many
warnings-and risking information overload-this system would best
work in conjunction with the proposal above, whereby the FDA would
issue a single mandatory label for all generic versions of the same
drug, and that label would result from careful monitoring of adverse
drug reactions submitted by generic manufacturers. The FDA would
create and update an injury compensation table, taking into account
the probability of such injuries given other confounding factors
presented by an injured individual. Patients who ingested the drug
before the side effect appeared on the label could file a claim for
compensation.
Claimants would need to prove that the drug caused their
injury, and a newly constituted Generic Drug Court would consider
the risk factors of the drug in addition to confounding factors-such as
age, weight, smoking history, and preexisting conditions-specific to
that individual. Compensation for a successful claim would include
medical expenses, lost wages, future medical care costs, and a
maximum of $250,000 in pain and suffering. In the event of death,
the deceased's estate could recover a comparable sum. Small taxes
per generic drug dose would fund the trust to compensate successful
claimants. To avoid conflicts of interest, the adjudicative body
determining compensation should not include any federal personnel
who play a part in creating the original labeling. 241 As with the
238. Cf. id.
239. Id. at 14.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 15.
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Vaccine Fund, plaintiffs would elect to accept or reject a favorable
judgment, and either party could appeal judgments to the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, and subsequently to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers provide
important health benefits to society. Pioneer companies undertake
the expensive research and clinical trials necessary to engineer new
drugs, while generic companies provide inexpensive drugs to the
American public. Because the Hatch-Waxman Act requires that
generic drug applications include warning labels identical to that of
the brand-name drug, plaintiffs injured by the generic version often
sue both pioneer and generic drug manufacturers for damages.
Mensing and Demahy, however, recognized the injustice of
holding a brand-name manufacturer liable for failing to warn a
patient who, as in Conte, never consumed that manufacturer's
product. 242 Assigning liability to the generic drug manufacturer for
failure to warn also seems unjust, because the FDA mandates that
labels of generics must match those of brand-name drugs. Moreover,
forcing generic drug manufacturers to pay plaintiffs will increase the
costs of generic drugs-contrary to the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act.
Congress could direct the FDA to explicitly allow generic drug
manufacturers to initiate label changes, but generic drug companies
do not enjoy the informational advantages pioneer companies
possess. 243 Additionally, forcing generic drug manufacturers to defend
against failure-to-warn claims, as well as any resulting judgments,
could dramatically increase the cost of generic drugs. Instead, the
FDA should control all generic labeling, combining clinical data from
the brand-name drug manufacturers with adverse drug reaction
reports from the generic companies to determine when side effects
warrant a revised label. Using the label mandated by the FDA would
then preempt failure-to-warm claims.
In conjunction with FDA-controlled labeling, a federal trust
similar to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund would allow
injured plaintiffs to recover damages according to a compensation grid
after agency review of other risk factors for the alleged injury. A
compensation trust fund could provide a remedy for injured
242. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 192-197, 202-203.
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individuals, vindicating the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' policy of
providing for plaintiffs, while allowing generic manufacturers to
continue generating inexpensive pharmaceuticals for the public. The
special case of generic drug labeling demands a universal and
comprehensive solution.
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